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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (e) , Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I.

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY
ADMIT HEARSAY STATEMENTS AS
"EXCITED
UTTERANCES"
IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 803(2)
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE?

The appropriate standard of review of a trial court's
decision to admit hearsay evidence under Rule 803 depends on
the particular ruling in dispute. Hansen
977(Utah

1993).

In

this

case,

the

v.

Heath,

issue

of

852 P.2d
whether

a

statement is an "excited utterance" is a factual determination
by the trial court and should be reviewed using an abuse of
discretion standard.

State

v.

Thomas,

111

P. 2d 445

(Utah

1989) . Whether or not the second prong of the Rule 803(2) test
has been satisfied is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. State

v.

Mickelson,

848 P.2d

1992) .

1

677,686

(Utah App.

ISSUE II.

DOES
HUTTO'S
BRIEF
FAIL TO
MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE
WHICH
SUPPORTS
THE TRIAL
COURT'S
DECISION
TO
ADMIT
EXCITED
UTTERANCE EVIDENCE?

The trial court's decision to admit the excited utterance
testimony of the victim Tyson is based upon certain factual
determinations of the trial court. When attacking the findings
of fact of a trial court the appellant must marshal all of the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, and
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inference drawn therefrom, is insufficient
findings against an attack. State

to support the

v. Moosman,

794 P.2d 474

(Utah 1990) .
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES
Rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule

803. Hearsay

exceptions;

availability

of declarant

immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness.
(2) Excited
startling

utterance.
event

A statement
or

condition

relating

made

to a

{

while the

2
i

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for a
violation of Section 76-5-102, Assault (Domestic Violence)
and Section 76-6-106, Criminal Mischief (Domestic Violence).

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On or about October 25, 1998, Wade Hutto ("Hutto") was
cited and booked into jail for Assault (Domestic Violence)
and Criminal Mischief (Domestic Violence).

An information

charging those two misdemeanor crimes was filed with the
court on December 2, 1998.

On December 16, 1998, a bench

trial was held before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn of the
Third District Court.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
At trial, Hutto was convicted of Assault (Domestic
Violence) and Criminal Mischief (Domestic Violence). Hutto
was sentenced to serve 180 days of consecutive jail time for
each conviction, was fined $150, and was put on probation to

3

the court for a period of 12 months.

One hundred eighty

days of the jail sentence was suspended.

(Record P.21).

Notice of appeal in this case was filed on March
8,1999.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues on
-'~::

,

appeal:

1. At approximately 9 a.m. on October 25, 1998, Officer
Jensen of the West Valley City Police Department responded
to a Domestic Assault report at 3079 South 3080 West in West
Valley City.
2.

(Transcript, p.5)

Upon arrival at the above referenced location,

Officer Jensen found the victim, Therese Tyson
Tyson stated that she had called the police.
p . 6) .

3.

("Tyson").
(Transcript

.

Officer Jensen observed that Tyson was dressed in

a t-shirt and a pair of jeans and was not wearing any shoes
or socks.
4.

(Transcript p.7).
Officer Jensen observed several injuries to Tyson.

She testified that Tyson had a small cut on her forehead
that had been bleeding, she had red marks on her neck, a one
or two inch in diameter red mark on her stomach, and a four

4

(

or five inch in diameter deep red mark on her back.
(Transcript pp.11-12).
5.

Officer Jensen testified that her impression of

Tyson's emotional state was "extremely upset", "very
agitated", and "quite nervous, her body language".
(Transcript p.7).

Officer Jensen also described how Tyson's

emotional state kept fluctuating throughout the interview.
(Transcript p.8).

Officer Jensen stated that even during

what she considered the "calm" periods of the interview,
Tyson was shaking and crying.

(Transcript p.8).

Jensen

testified that during these "calm" periods you could "at
least get her attention and talk to her".

During her more

agitated periods, Jensen described Tyson as unable to
focus.(Transcript p.8).
stopping while

Jensen testified that Tyson kept

writing her witness statement and had to be

continually reminded to continue.
6.

(Transcript p. 20).

The court allowed Officer Jensen to recite certain

statements made by Tyson for the limited purpose of
determining whether Tyson's statements were excited
utterances, and therefore, admissible pursuant to Rule
803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.
7.

(Transcript pp. 9-10).

Officer Jensen testified that she had been told by

5

Tyson that Tyson's live in boy friend, Wade Hut to, had
assaulted her at approximately 3:30 a.m. that morning.
(Transcript p.10).
8.

Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court

determined that the statements made by Tyson to Officer
Jensen were excited utterances and allowed Officer Jensen to
continue to testify about Tyson's statements pursuant to
Rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.
9.

(Transcript p. 21).

Following the court's ruling, Officer Jensen

testified that Tyson had stated the following:
a.

Hutto had been mad at her for refusing to go get
drugs.

b.

(Transcript p. 21).

During the argument Hutto started hitting and
pushing her.

More specifically, Hutto punched her

in the side of her head, knocking her head into
another object which caused the cut on her
forehead.

Hutto also hit her in the back with

something, but Tyson didn't know what the object
was.

Tyson also stated that Hutto had been

• standing on her neck.

(Transcript p. 22).

(

6

c,

Tyson also told Officer Jensen that she had left
her house in the middle of the night and had run
to her mother's house.

10.

(Transcript pp. 21-23).

Officer Jensen testified that the distance between

the address at which she interviewed Tyson, which was
Tyson's mother's house, and Tyson's house, was six blocks.
(Transcript p. 23).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING CERTAIN
STATEMENTS AS "EXCITED UTTERANCES" IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 803(2) UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE.

Approximately five and one half to six hours after
being assaulted, suffering numerous injuries, and fleeing
her residence, Therese Tyson made several statements to a
police officer. The officer described Tyson as extremely
upset, very agitated, crying and shaking.

The trial court

correctly determined that these statements met the three
prong test for admissibility under Rule 803(2), Utah Rules
of Evidence. The court found that there occurred a startling
event (the assault, the injuries and the flight), Tyson was
still under the stress and excitement of the startling event
when making the statements, and her statements were directly
7

related to the startling event.

The trial court's decision

to admit these statements was based upon the above stated
findings of fact and was not an abuse of discretion.
II.

HUTTO'S BRIEF FAILS TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION TO ADMIT EXCITED UTTERANCE
EVIDENCE.

The trial court's decision to admit excited utterance
evidence is based upon certain predicate evidence necessary
to meet the three prong test under Rule 803(2).

Hutto's

brief attacks the courts decision to admit the evidence, but
fails to marshal the facts upon which that decision was
based. When challenging the factual findings of the trial
court on appeal, the appellant must show that the factual
findings were clearly erroneous. In order to show error, the
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against
an attack. State

v.

Moosman,

794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). Hutto

has failed to adequately marshal the evidence which supports
the trial court's factual findings.

That failure

constitutes a separate and valid reason for affirming the
decision of the trial court.
8

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.;

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING CERTAIN
STATEMENTS AS "EXCITED UTTERANCES" IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 803(2) UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE.

The trial court correctly concluded that Therese
Tyson's statements, which were made while she was extremely
upset, very agitated, crying, shaking, and exhibiting
numerous injuries, were excited utterances and, therefore,
inherently reliable.

The trial court's decision to admit

these statements was based upon the evidence that had been
provided to the trial court and was not an abuse of
discretion.
As a general rule, hearsay statements are not allowed
into evidence in court proceedings.

However, certain

hearsay statements are considered to be inherently reliable
and, therefore, exceptions to the hearsay prohibition have
been created.

One such exception is the "excited

utterance." This exception has been codified as Rule 803(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence.

The excited utterance exception has

a long history and is considered to be a "firmly rooted"

9

White

exception to the hearsay rule.

v.

Illinois,

502 U.S.

34 6, n.8 (1992) .
Excited utterances are a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule because of their high degree of reliability.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that:

"Admission

under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the

•--'

constitutional requirement of reliability because of the
weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative

v.r

experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types
of out-of-court statements."
805(1990).

Idaho

v.

Wright

4 95 U.S.

Also, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an

excited utterance case, has stated "reliability may be
inferred without any further showing if the statement falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."
926 F.2d 955(10th Cir. 1991).

Cole

v.

Tansy,

The Utah courts have also

firmly established that excited utterances are admissible
because the circumstances under which such statements are
given provides
State v.

sufficient assurance

Mickelson,

of trustworthiness.

848 P.2d 677(Utah App.1992).

The Utah Supreme Court has established a three prong
test for determining whether a statement is admissible as an
excited utterance under Rule 803(2).

10

This test establishes

that a statement is an excited utterance only when (1) a
startling event or condition occurred; (2) the statement was
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition, and (3) the statement
relates to the startling event or condition.
784 P.2d 1197(Utah 1989).

State

v.

Cude,

In this case, there is not any

dispute that a startling event occurred and, therefore, the
first prong of the test has been met.

There was evidence

before the court that the victim Tyson had numerous fresh
injuries.

Also, the way she was dressed, in light clothing

and no shoes or socks, support her statement that she fled
her house.
The issue in this case is the second prong of the test,
whether or not Tyson's statements were produced under the
stress and excitement of the startling event.

The Utah

Supreme Court has recognized that this is often a difficult
issue.

In State v.

Smith,

909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), the

court stated:
Usually the most difficult issue in
determining the admissibility of an
excited utterance is whether the
statement was uttered with the
spontaneity produced by emotional
excitement to a degree that provides a
warrant of trustworthiness. The
determination requires an evaluation of a
11

variety of factors, including the nature
of the startling event and the intensity
of the excitement or other emotional
effect on the declarant.
State

v.

Smith,

at page 240.

Hutto argues that the time period between the startling
event and Tyson's statements to Officer Jensen, a period of
five and one half to six hours, is too long a period to fall
within the excited utterance rule.
not accurate.

This argument is simply

The time lapse between the startling event

and the statement is not one of the prongs of the Rule
803(2) test.

Courts have held that temporal proximity of

the events is only one of the factors to be considered and
is not dispositive of the application of the exception to
the hearsay rule.
see also Gross

v.

State
Greer,

v.

Smith,

909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995);

773 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It is

well established that the lapse of time between the
startling event and the out-of-court statement, although
relevant, is not dispositive in the application of the res
gestae exception to the hearsay rule."); Washington
Fleming,
Thomas,

621 P.2d 779 (Wash. App. 1980); United

v.

States

v.

149 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 1998)(x\..there is no

bright-line rule restricting the amount of time that can
pass between a startling event and an excited utterance; the
12

key factor is whether the declarant is still under the
stress of the startling event.").

(Pursuant to 10th Cir.

Rule 36.3, and Rule 24(a) (11) (B) , Utah R. App. P., this case
is attached as an addendum to this brief.)
We can also look to the federal courts interpretation
of the analogous federal rule for guidance.
footnote 7, at page 1200.
Akins,

State

For example, in United

v.

Cude,

States

v.

153 F.3d 728 (10th Cir. 1998), an Order and Judgment

which is not binding precedent, the court stated:
We have previously stated that "lapse of
time does not necessarily negative the
existence of an excited state."
Garcia
v. Watkins,
604 F.2d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir.
1979). Thus, we have held that so long
as the evidence demonstrated that a
declarant made an out-of-court statement
while still under the stress of a
startling event, that statement was
admissible as an excited utterance
notwithstanding the fact that the
declarant made the statement nine hours,

see United

States

v. Rosetta,

1997 WL

651027, at **2 (10th Cir. Oct 10, 1997),
or even a full day, see United States
v.
th
Farley,
992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10 Cir.
1993), after the startling event.
United

States

v. Akins.

(Pursuant to 10th Cir. Rule

36.3, and Rule 24(a)(11)(B), Utah R. App. P., this case is
attached as an addendum to the brief.)

13

The Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that
while the passage of time is one measure of whether a
statement is the product of a startling occurrence, it is
not the most reliable one.

Mickelson,

at page 685.

The

real question that the court must answer when determining
admissibility of excited utterance hearsay is whether the
statement was made while the declarant was still under the
influence of the event to the extent that the statement
cannot be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or
the exercise of choice or judgment.

The Utah Supreme Court

has termed this the "crucial question."
page 449.

State

v.

Thomas,

at

In this case, there was sufficient evidence

presented to the trial court to indicate

that Tyson's

statements were made under great stress and excitement. Such
evidence is adequate to satisfy the second prong of the Rule
803(2) test.

In State

v.

Mickelson,

the Court of Appeals

stated:
Evidence that there was a reasonable
basis for the declarant's continuing
emotional distress, or that the declarant
was actually nervous or distraught at the
time the statement was made, has
generally been accepted as adequate to
rebut the presumption against an excited
utterance. See, e.g., Webb v. Lane, 922
F.2d 390, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1991)
(statements made several hours after
14

>...•"'

shooting were excited utterances, since
declarant was still in extreme pain and
shock after being shot); United States v.
Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990)
(lapse of five or six hours between
beating and statement not dispositive
when victim was still very nervous);
State v. Anaya, 799 P.2d 876,881(Ariz.
App 1990); People v. Sandoval, 709 P.2d
90, 92 (Colo. App. 1985).
State

v.

Mickelson,

at page 685.

This determination as to the degree of emotional
arousal and spontaneity of the declarant is subject to no
State

precise or absolute standard.

v.

Smith,

at page 240.

In this case, there is ample evidence to support the trial
court's determination that such emotional arousal and
spontaneity surrounded Tyson's statements to Officer Jensen.
Officer Jensen testified that her impression of Tyson's
emotional state was "extremely upset".

She also described

Tyson as "very agitated" and "quite nervous, her body
language".

(Transcript p.7).

During her testimony, Officer

Jensen also described how Tyson's emotional state kept
fluctuating throughout the interview.

Officer Jensen

testified that even during what she considered to be Tyson's
"calm" periods, Tyson was shaking and crying.
p.8)

(Transcript

During her more emotional periods, Tyson was described

as being unable to focus and her mind would race off to the
15

retelling of other situations and events.
8).

(Transcript p.

Also, Officer Jensen observed numerous injuries to

Tyson's body.

Clearly these injuries would contribute to

her state of excitement.
Officer Jensen's description of Tyson as "extremely
upset", "very agitated", and "shaking, still crying" is very
similar to the evidence produced in the Mickelson

case. In

that case, the court found that a four or five hour time
delay supported a presumption that the victim was no longer
under the stress of the startling event.

However, the court

also found that the facts produced regarding the actual
emotional state of the victim at the time of the statement
were adequate to rebut that presumption.

In describing the

evidence, the court stated "...she was visibly upset and
nervous, and had been crying—evidence that, despite
sufficient time for reflective thought, W.M.'s statements
were nonetheless the result of the stress of the startling
event."

Mickelson,

at page 686.

Hutto directs the court's attention to Exhibit I, the
statement written by Tyson during her interview with Officer
Jensen.

However, the preparation of this statement is a

factor which supports the conclusion that Tyson was in an
i

16
(

excited state.

Officer Jensen testified that it took Tyson

approximately one half hour to 45 minutes to write the
witness statement because she kept stopping and had to be
reminded to continue by Officer Jensen.

If she couldn't

focus her thoughts clearly enough to complete the statement,
how could she focus her thoughts enough to fabricate her
story?
Hutto also argues that Tyson spent the interval
between the startling event and the statements with her
mother and speculates that this may have effected Tyson's
statement.

(Appellant's Brief pp.14, 16). This entire

argument is pure speculation and is simply not based upon
the record.

There is no indication whatsoever in the record

as to the amount of time Tyson spent with her mother.

The

only reference to the presence of Tyson's mother that is
contained in the record indicates that Tyson's mother was
present at the time the police were conducting their
interview.

(Transcript pp.7, 12). Even if Hutto is correct

in his speculation, and Tyson's mother was present during
the interval, this is simply a non-issue.

Tyson's emotional

and mental state at the time the statements were made was
more that adequately proven by the testimony of Officer

17

Jensen. The trial court correctly determined that Tyson's
statements to officer Jensen were made while Tyson was still
under the stress and excitement of the startling event.

The

second prong of the Rule 803(2) test was satisfied.
The third prong of the Rule 803(2) test is not in
dispute.

Clearly, the statements made by Tyson regarding

Hutto's assault and her nighttime flight to her mother's
house are directly related to the startling event - Hutto's
assault.
Given the facts before him, an obviously very upset,
agitated, injured woman, who has fled her home in the middle
of the night, the trial judge correctly determined that the
statements made by Tyson to Officer Jensen were produced
under the stress and excitement of the assault.

This is

true even though the statements were made five and one half
to six hours after the assault.

Tyson was incapable of

focusing her thoughts well enough to entertain the type of
reflective thinking necessary to fabricate her story.

The

facts related to the officer by Tyson are inherently
reliable and are admissible under Rule 803(2) Utah Rules of
Evidence.
i
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II.

HUTTO'S BRIEF FAILS TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING THE
VERDICTS OF THE TRIAL COURT.

The trial court's decision to admit excited utterance
evidence is based upon certain predicate evidence necessary
to meet the test under Rule 803(2).

Hutto's brief attacks

the courts decision to admit the evidence, but fails to
marshal the facts upon which that decision was based. The
law of the State of Utah on this subject is well settled.
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on
appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact
were clearly erroneous. In order to show error, the
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings

of fact and then demonstrate that

the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against
an attack. State

v. Moosman,

794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990).

Hutto's brief fails to present almost all of the
evidence which supported the trial court's determination
that Tyson's statements were excited utterances.

He fails

to inform the court that Officer Jensen testified that Tyson
was "very agitated", "extremely upset", "quite nervous", and
that she was crying and shaking. (Transcript pp. 7-8). He

19

also fails to describe her injuries in any detail.

Instead,

Hutto simply recites those few facts which he believes are
favorable to his appeal. This one sided version of the
factual findings underlying the trial court's decision does
not meet the marshaling requirements.

State

v. Decorso,

370

Utah Adv. Rep 11 (Utah 1999). Peck's failure to adequately
marshal the evidence which supports the trial court's ruling
is a separate and valid reason for affirming the decision of
the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that statements made by a extremely upset, very
agitated, crying, shaking, and injured woman were excited
utterances and, therefore, admissible exceptions to the
hearsay prohibition under Rule 803(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence. The convictions should be affirmed.

i

DATED t h i s

day of

OdroBtti

, 1999.

WEST VALLEY CITY

V?^^£
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT^
Before TACHA, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Deyon Thomas was tried before a jury and convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He was sentenced to approximately 26 years in prison.
Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentencing. We exercise jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 3742(a), and affirm.
Background
On January 10, 1996, a Denver drug task force used Christopher Epperson, a government informant with
drug charges pending against him, to make a controlled buy of cocaine base (or crack cocaine) at a
suspected crack house at 3102 Columbine. When Epperson knocked and rang the doorbell, defendant
Deyon Thomas opened the door, holding a gun in his left hand. Epperson testified that the weapon
appeared to be a black steel .45 caliber gun.^D As Epperson entered the house, Thomas moved the gun
behind his back, but Epperson did not see exactly what he did with it. The drug transaction took about
ten minutes, during which time Epperson paid Thomas $240 in exchange for drugs, later confirmed to be
crack cocaine. Epperson testified that Will Harper, Thomas's half-brother, also was in the room while the
transaction was conducted.
Shortly after the controlled buy, officers obtained and executed a search warrant for the house. The
police used a crowbar to open the screen door and a ninety-pound ram to break down the front door. The
first officer to enter the residence saw Thomas move quickly out of sight. After pursuing Thomas, the
officer found Thomas on his back on the floor with his hands in the air begging the officer not to shoot
him. Another officer found a nine millimeter handgun on the floor near where the defendant was lying
down. During the search of the house, the officers also found various caches of crack cocaine hidden
about the house, as well as a scale of the sort typically used by drug dealers to measure out quantities of
drugs. A search of Thomas's person revealed $1,735 in cash hidden in his socks.
Thomas and Harper were both arrested. While they were in the police car, Harper made statements to
Thomas that the dope found in the house belonged to Thomas and that Harper himself was not involved.

During initial questioning by officers at the scene, Thomas stated that he was house sitting for a friend
and that the gun the officers found had always been there, as long as he had been there. He stated that he
had been burglarized recently, that he grabbed the gun when he heard people forcibly entering the house
because he thought they might be burglars, and that he then dropped it upon hearing the officers yelled
"police." Upon further questioning at the police station, however, he stated that a man named Kevin had
supplied him with a ticket to Denver, given him fifteen ounces of crack cocaine to sell, given him a gun
and a customer list, and allowed him to use the residence at 3201 Columbine for dealing the drugs. Prior
to both periods of questioning, Thomas signed forms acknowledging that he had been informed of his
rights.
Thomas contests his convictions and sentencing on a variety of grounds. First, he argues that there was
insufficient evidence that he used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug offense as required
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Second, he contends that the trial court should not have allowed Harper's
hearsay statement to be introduced into evidence as an excited utterance. Third, he argues that the
government failed to prove the substance involved was crack cocaine, and thus he should have been
sentenced for powder cocaine rather than for crack. Fourth, he claims that the sentencing guidelines
regarding crack cocaine are unconstitutional. Finally, he asserts that the trial judge should have recused
himself before sentencing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Discussion
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Section 924(c) Conviction
The defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he used or carried a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We review
the record de novo to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. See,
e.g.. United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997). Evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the government, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See
id. In evaluating the evidence under this standard, the court will not question a jury's credibility
determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the evidence. See United States v. Johnson, 57
F.3d968,971 (10th Cir. 1995).
Section 924(c) imposes a mandatory five-year sentence on a defendant who "uses or carries" a firearm
"during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l).(2} In the context of section
924(c), "use" means "active employment" of the firearm by the defendant, which includes brandishing or
displaying the firearm. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 148 (1995). The term "carry"
involves two elements: "'possession of the weapon through the exercise of dominion or control; and
transportation of the weapon.'" United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1465 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 117
S. Ct. 385 (1996) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 419, 420 (10th Cir. 1990)). The evidence
here was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant both used and carried a weapon during and in
relation to the drug trafficking crime.
It was undisputed at trial that Thomas was displaying a gun when he came to the door. There was
evidence before the jury that the primary purpose of the house, and Thomas's presence there, was to run
a crack cocaine sales operation. A government witness testified that drug dealers often carried firearms
to protect themselves, the drugs, and the drug proceeds against rival distributors and against individuals
who might come to the "crack house" seeking to steal rather than purchase the drugs. A reasonable
inference from all this evidence was that the defendant displayed the weapon because he expected the
call to be for a drug transaction, and that he wanted to deter the caller from attempting to harm him or
steal the drugs or the proceeds. Although Thomas claimed that he carried the weapon because he feared
burglars, the jury was free to reject that assertion; we will not review the jury's credibility
determinations. See Johnson, 57 F.3d at 971. The evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find
that, by displaying the weapon at the door, the defendant used the weapon during and in relation to a
drug transaction.
The evidence also is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Thomas carried the weapon during and

in relation to the drug transaction. Although Epperson could not see exactly what Thomas did with the
weapon when he put it behind his back, a reasonable inference is that he placed it in the back of his
waistband and was carrying it throughout the drug transaction. There was a sufficient evidentiary basis,
therefore, for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant violated section 924(c).
In making his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, the defendant notes the discrepancy in the evidence
relating to the gun. Epperson testified that Thomas arrived at the door with a black steel .45, while the
actual gun found near the defendant during the police search of the premises was a chrome (silver) nine
millimeter. There are several ways in which a reasonable juror might resolve this evidentiary
discrepancy in favor of the government. For instance, a juror might believe that Thomas brought the nine
millimeter to the door to meet Epperson, and that Epperson mistakenly recollected the gun as a black
.45. Because a reasonable juror could resolve the conflict in favor of the government, the discrepancy
does not make the evidence insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for violating section
924(c).
2. Admission of Harper's "Excited Utterance"
The defendant argues that the statements made by his half-brother, Harper, who did not testify at trial,
should not have been allowed into evidence because they were inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid.
802. The district court allowed the government to introduce the statements under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(2), which permits the introduction of "excited utterances" as an exception to the hearsay
rule. An "excited utterance" is defined as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Fed. R. Evid.
803(2). The district court found that Harper's statements fell within the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule because they were made while he was still under the stress of the police breaking into the
house and arresting him.
We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Trujillo,
136 F.3d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir.), petition for cert, filed, (U.S. May 5, 1998) (No. 97-8977). "Because
hearsay determinations are particularly fact and case specific," our review of those decisions is
especially deferential. Id. Thomas contends that the statements were not sufficiently close in time to the
"startling event" (i.e., the officers breaking into the house) to fall within the scope of Rule 803(2).
However, there is no bright-line rule restricting the amount of time that can pass between a startling
event and an excited utterance; the key factor is whether the declarant is still under the stress of the
startling event. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (containing no time element); Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory
committee's note; United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, the district court
found that the officers' entry into the house with a battering ram was a startling event. The court
determined that Harper was still very upset and had not fully recovered from that event at the time he
made the statements. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Harper's statements
under Rule 803(2).
Thomas also contends that admitting Harper's hearsay statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him.^ A trial court should allow the admission of a hearsay statement
against a criminal defendant "only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 66 (1980). "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. We have previously held that the "excited utterance" exception
embodied in Rule 803(2) is a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule. See United States v. Jackson,
88 F.3d 845, 847 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992)). Thus, the
admission of Harper's excited utterances under Rule 803(2) did not violate Harper's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation.
Thomas argues that Harper's statements were not reliable because they tended to exculpate Harper and
incriminate Thomas. Cfi Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (noting that "when one person accuses
another of a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the
accusation is presumptively suspect"). However, because the hearsay statements at issue here fall within
a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the court properly inferred that the statements were
sufficiently reliable to be admitted. See Roberts, 44 U.S. at 66. Therefore, the district court did not err in

stating that the exculpatory nature of Harper's statements would go only to the weight to be given them
by the jury.
3. Sentencing for Crack Cocaine
Thomas contends that he should have been sentenced for powder cocaine rather than for crack cocaine
(which carries a heavier penalty) because the government failed to prove that the substance involved was
crack cocaine. Because he did not raise this issue at trial, we review only for plain error. See United
States v. Walker, 137 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).
We find no error here. Two forensic scientists testified for the government that the substance Epperson
bought was crack cocaine. The defendant offered no evidence to rebut that testimony. The district court
did not commit plain error in sentencing for crack cocaine.
4. Constitutionality of Sentencing Guidelines' Disparate Treatment of Crack and Powder Cocaine
Next, Thomas asserts that the disparity in the sentencing provisions for crack cocaine and powder
cocaine is unconstitutional. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2Dl.l(c) (drug table)
(1995(4)) (treating one gram of crack as equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine for sentencing
purposes). Thomas argues that the harsher penalties for crack cocaine disproportionately affect black
defendants in violation of the Constitution. Although the defendant does not cite to a specific provision
of the Constitution, we assume he intends to bring his argument under the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as have other defendants. See, e.g.. United States v.
Ashley, 26 F.3d 1008, 1013 (10th Cir. 1994).
Thomas failed to raise this issue below, so we review for plain error. See Walker, 137F.3dat 1219. We
have repeatedly rejected claims that section 2D 1.1(c) violates the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection and due process. See, e.g., Ashley, 26 F.3d at 1013; United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947,
950-53 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, we reject Thomas's attack on the constitutionality of section 2D 1.1.
5. Recusal
Finally, the defendant argues that the district court judge should have recused himself from sentencing.
Specifically, Thomas argues that certain comments made by the judge to the jury after they returned
their verdict demonstrated the judge's bias against the defendant. Thomas filed a motion for recusal after
those comments, which the district court denied. We review the denial of that motion for abuse of
discretion. See Cauthon v. Rogers, 116 F.3d 1334, 1336 (10th Cir. 1997).
The district court judge made the following comments to the jury:
This trial has really involved you through a large picture window view of a sad part of our society, one
that has many, many victims and one that involves enormous cost, not the least of which is simply the
trial that we went through and the investigation and the effort and production of the people here in court
to provide their testimony, and the fact that we have this . . . illegal industry, the scourge on the public
that is traveling across this country where drugs are — illegal drugs are imported and sold on the street.
R.O.A. vol. 8 at 8.
"Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The court must ask
"whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's
impartiality." United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). We agree with the district court and the government that the statements quoted above
amount to no more than what "Congress was saying to all of us when it passed these [drug] laws,"
R.O.A. vol 9 at 19 (comments of district court at sentencing)-!.e., that drug use and drug dealing are
significant problems in the United States. These statements do not demonstrate partiality. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the jury's verdict and the sentence imposed upon the
defendant.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
FOOTNOTES
Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

^This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
-^During a subsequent search of the premises, the police recovered a gun from the defendant. The gun
recovered was a chrome nine millimeter handgun rather than a black .45. We will discuss this apparent
conflict in the evidence in more detail below.
^ Many defendants recently have challenged their convictions in light of Bailey v. United States, 516
U.S. 137 (1995), which addressed the meaning of the "use" prong of section 924(c). However, Thomas's
trial was held after Bailey was decided and he does not challenge the "use" instructions given to the jury
in his case.
^ The hearsay rule and the confrontation clause address similar concerns. They are not, however,
identical rules. See, e.g.. Fed. R. Evid. Article VIII advisory committee notes. Therefore, we analyze the
two issues separately.
^ As a general rule, we refer to the version of the guidelines that was in effect at the time of the
defendant's sentencing. See United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 n.l (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 118
S. Ct. 1334(1998).
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT^
Before EBEL, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
INTRODUCTION
In February 1997, a grand jury entered a one-count indictment charging Jude T. Akins, a convicted
felon, with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) by possessing a firearm. At trial, over Mr. Akins's objection, the
district court admitted testimony from two police officers and from Ms. Lissie Purenell that on
December 29, 1996, Evelyn Culpepper and her children told them that Mr. Akins had threatened Ms.
Culpepper with a pair of guns earlier that night. The jury subsequently found Mr. Akins guilty as
charged. Mr. Akins now appeals that conviction, arguing that the district court erred by admitting the
testimony of the police officers and Ms. Purenell. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted this testimony, we affirm Mr. Akins's conviction.
DISCUSSION
"Evidentiary decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review those decisions
only for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1995). Moreover,
"[o]ur review is especially deferential when the challenged ruling concerns the admissibility of evidence
that is allegedly hearsay." Id.
The district court admitted each of the challenged statements under Fed. R. Ev. 803(2), the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(2) allows admission of "[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition." Thus, a statement is admissible as an excited utterance when:
1. a startling event occurs;
2. the declarant makes a statement while under the stress and excitement caused by the event; and
3. the statement relates to the startling event.
See id.; United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1355 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 566 (1997); see
also Cole v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991) (utilizing the same three-pronged test to
determine whether statement constituted an excited utterance under New Mexico rules of evidence).
Thus, we must examine whether the statements of Ms. Culpepper and her children pass muster under
Rule 803(2).
1. A Startling Event Occurred

Ms. Purenell testified that on the night of December 29, 1996, she witnessed Mr. Akins choking Ms.
Culpepper. Aplt's App. vol. II, at 37-38, 44, 51. This attack certainly qualifies as a startling event with
respect to Ms. Culpepper. However, because Ms. Purenell's testimony is equivocal as to whether Ms.
Culpepper's children witnessed this attack, see idL at 38, we must look elsewhere to see if the children
experienced any other startling event that night.
However, we need not look far to find such an event. At trial, Sergeant Craig Fox testified that when he
arrived at Ms. Purenell's home (the scene of the altercation between Mr. Akins and Ms. Culpepper), Ms.
Culpepper's oldest child told him that Mr. Akins had been carrying a pair of guns and had threatened to
shoot Ms. Culpepper. See id. at 95. Ms. Purenell also testified that at least two of Ms. Culpepper's other
three children made similar statements to the police. See idL at 45. And we have no doubt that a child
who has witnessed someone threatening to shoot his mother has experienced a startling event.
Mr. Akins contends that we cannot rely on the children's statements to establish that a startling event
occurred because there is nothing to corroborate the children's version of the events. However, Mr.
Akins ignores the fact that the children's statements were, in fact, corroborated by the police's
subsequent discovery of a pair of guns in a nearby tree. See idL at 68-72. Moreover, their version of
events is further supported by Ms. Purenell's testimony that she witnessed a violent confrontation
between Mr. Akins and Ms. Culpepper and by Sergeant Fox's testimony that the children appeared to be
frightened when he arrived on the scene. Thus, we need not reach the question of whether
uncorroborated statements, without more, may prove the occurrence of a startling event for Rule 803(2)
purposes.
II. The Declarants Were Under The Stress Of A Startling Event When They Made Their
Statements
Mr. Akins next argues that neither Ms. Culpepper nor her children made their declarations while they
were "under the stress of excitement caused by the event." Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). In particular, he
suggests that too much time passed between the confrontation and the declarations for those declarations
to qualify as excited utterances under Rule 803(2).
As a threshold matter, we note that the government introduced ample evidence to support the district
court's conclusion that at the time Ms. Culpepper and her children made their statements, they were still
under the stress of the excitement caused by confrontation between Mr. Akins and Ms. Culpepper. For
instance, Sergeant Fox testified that at the time Ms. Culpepper spoke with him, "[s]he was very visibly
shaken, she was trembling, almost crying as she spoke to me, [and] had a look and a sound of fear in her
voice." Aplt's App. vol. II, at 92; see also id. at 43 (M[s]he was scared"), 60 ("she appeared to be nervous
and scared"), 101 ([s]he was still shaken up"). Similarly, both Sergeant Fox and Ms. Culpepper testified
that at the time the Culpepper children made their statements, they appeared to be "scared." See id. at
40-43, 94; see also id. at 61, 63 (describing children's demeanor as "excited"). Mr. Akins offered no
evidence to contradict any of this testimony.
It is not clear how much time passed between the confrontation and when Ms. Culpepper and her
children made their statements. However, the record does establish that both Ms. Culpepper and her
children made their statements after the police had arrived on the scene. See, e.g., id. at 45, 63-64, 93.
Officer Howard Montalvo, the only police officer who testified regarding this issue, stated that he
arrived approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after he received the call from the dispatcher. Id. at 58.
And by the time Officer Montalvo arrived, several other police officers, including Sergeant Fox (the
only other officer who testified at trial regarding the statements of Ms. Culpepper and her children) were
already on the scene. Id. Thus, even were we to assume that: (1) several minutes passed between the
time Ms. Purenell summoned the police and the time the dispatcher called Officer Montalvo; (2) a full
twenty minutes passed between the call and the time that Officer Montalvo arrived; and (3) Ms.
Culpepper and her children did not make their statements to Officer Montalvo and Sergeant Fox until
several minutes after Officer Montalvo's arrival, this would mean that less than an hour elapsed between
the confrontation and the time that Ms. Culpepper and her children made their statements.

We have previously stated that "lapse of time does not necessarily negative the existence of an excited
state." Garcia v. Watkins, 604 F.2d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1979). Thus, we have held that so long as the
evidence demonstrated that a declarant made an out-of-court statement while still under the stress of a
startling event, that statement was admissible as an excited utterance notwithstanding the fact that the
declarant made the statement nine hours, see United States v. Rosetta, 1997 WL 651027, at **2 (10th
Cir. Oct. 20, 1997), or even a full day, see United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1993),
after the startling event. Consequently, the fact that an hour may have elapsed between the confrontation
and the time that Ms. Culpepper and her children made their statements will not remove those statements
from purview of Rule 803(2), since the unrefuted evidence demonstrates that Ms. Culpepper and her
children were still experiencing the stress and excitement caused by the confrontation at the time they
made their statements.
III. The Declarations Related To A Startling Event
The final requirement for admission under Rule 803(2) is that the out-of-court statement must "relat[e]
to a startling event." Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). The statements of Ms. Culpepper and her children easily clear
this hurdle, as all of those statements related to the confrontation between Mr. Akins and Ms. Culpepper.
See Aplt's Brief at 7-8.
Mr. Akins also offers a last, novel argument: that the district court should have excluded the testimony
of Ms. Purenell and the two police officers because at trial these witnesses did not directly quote Ms.
Culpepper and her children but, rather, only paraphrased their statements. However, Rule 803(2) does
not require witnesses to have photographic memories. Thus, we will not exclude the testimony of Ms.
Purenell and the police two officers merely because these witnesses did not quote Ms. Culpepper and her
children verbatim.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the testimony of Ms. Purenell,
Sergeant Fox, and Officer Montalvo regarding the out-of-court statements of Ms. Culpepper and her
children. And although neither Ms. Culpepper nor her children were available to testify at trial, because
the district court acted within its discretion in admitting the testimony regarding their out-of-court
statements, the admission of this testimony did not run afoul of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment.
See, e.g., Haskell v. United States Dep't of Agric, 930 F.2d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
district court did not violate a party's due process or confrontation rights when it admitted business
records that were co-authored by an individual who was unavailable to testify at trial). Accordingly, we
hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
FOOTNOTES
Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

^ This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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